ahmadreza Hemmati Moghaddam; Shima hadinia
Abstract
Phenomenal qualities of conscious mental states are commonly known as “qualia”. We say that a particular mental state has qualia if and only if There is something that it is like to be the mental state. Some philosophers have challenged the epistemic and explanatory values of qualia. They ...
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Phenomenal qualities of conscious mental states are commonly known as “qualia”. We say that a particular mental state has qualia if and only if There is something that it is like to be the mental state. Some philosophers have challenged the epistemic and explanatory values of qualia. They argue that the concept of qualia has no role to play in a mature and well-organized psychological theory. Consequently, this concept has no epistemic value. This paper aims at explaining and criticizing these arguments. It will be argued that these arguments are ineffective and cannot establish that the concept of qualia can not have functions in a scientific theories. The distinction between metaphysical subjectivity and epistemic objectivity, as it will be shown, can establish a scientific place for the concept of qualia.